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This paper analyzes the impact of international trade on the quality of institutions, such as contract
enforcement, property rights, or investor protection. It presents a model in which imperfect institutions
create rents for some parties within the economy, and are a source of comparative advantage in trade.
Institutional quality is determined as an equilibrium of a political economy game. When countries
share the same technology, there is a "race to the top'' in institutional quality: irrespective of country
characteristics, both trade partners are forced to improve institutions after opening. On the other hand,
domestic institutions will not improve in either country when one of the countries has a strong enough
technological comparative advantage in the institutionally intensive good. We provide empirical evidence
for a related cross-sectional prediction of the model. Countries whose exogenous geographical characteristics
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Recent literature on the economics of institutions has established a set of important results. First,
institutions matter a great deal for economic performance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny, e.g. 1997, 1998, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, e.g. 2001, 2005a, Rodrik, e.g. 2007).
Second, in spite of the obvious overall benets to institutional improvement, institutions are in
fact very persistent (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). Relatedly, episodes of institutional change are
rare, and they are typically associated with large and abrupt changes in the economic environment.
Finally, institutions are a source of comparative advantage in trade, and the welfare consequences
of institutional comparative advantage are often ambiguous (Levchenko 2007, Nunn 2007, Costinot
2009).
This paper analyzes the impact of international trade on economic institutions. This is an
important question, because it is widely hoped that greater openness will improve institutional
quality through a variety of channels, including reducing rents, creating constituencies for reform,
and inducing specialization in sectors that demand good institutions (International Monetary Fund
2005, Johnson, Ostry and Subramanian 2007). Indeed, Rodrik (2000) argues that the greatest
growth benets of trade liberalization may well come not from the conventional channels, but
from the institutional reform that trade liberalization can engender. However, no well-accepted
theoretical framework or a set of basic results on this question currently exist. This paper is an
attempt to ll this gap.
We develop a model in which institutions play two key roles. First, they generate rents for some
parties within the economy. Second, they are a source of comparative advantage in trade. Then,
we endogenize institutional quality using a simple political economy model in which some groups
lobby for rents created by imperfect institutions. When countries share the same technology, trade
leads to a \race to the top" in institutional quality. Trading partners improve institutions up to
the best attainable level after opening, as they compete to capture the sectors that generate rents.
By contrast, when one of the trading partners has a suciently strong technological comparative
advantage in the rent-generating good, institutions do not improve after trade opening in either
country. When other sources of comparative advantage are strong enough, changing institutions
will not aect trade patterns, and thus trade does not create an incentive to improve them.
To analyze the eect of trade on institutional quality, we must rst build a model of institu-
tions. To do so, this paper uses the insights from the incomplete contracts literature exemplied
by Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986). The quality of contract enforcement is
important because it allows agents to overcome the well-known holdup problem. This modeling
approach leads to a concrete interpretation of what constitutes institutional quality, suggested by
1Caballero and Hammour (1998): in countries with worse institutions contracts are more incomplete.
This framework can be adapted seamlessly and tractably to both trade openness and the political
economy of institutions.
An important aspect of the incomplete contracts setup is that some parties to production earn
rents. Those parties benet from making institutions worse, up to a certain point, and thus have
an incentive to lobby for imperfect institutions. This feature lends itself naturally to endogenizing
institutions in the political economy framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). We show that
equilibrium institutions can be sub-optimal, as the parties beneting from rents lobby against
the rst-best level of institutions. Thus, one of the contributions of this paper is to introduce a
parsimonious and tractable model of endogenous institutions, that combines the insights from the
literatures on both incomplete contracts and political economy.1
Under trade, both countries set institutions non-cooperatively as in the two-country model
of Grossman and Helpman (1995). The key force driving institutional change is what happens
to the rents when countries open to trade. There are several cases to consider. When countries
share the same technology, institutional dierences are the salient source of comparative advantage.
After trade opening, only the country with better institutions produces the institutionally intensive
good, which is characterized by rents. By contrast, the rents disappear in the country with inferior
institutions.2 The resulting political economy equilibrium is a \race to the top" in institutional
quality: both countries improve institutions up to the best attainable level. This is because rents
{ the very reason to lobby for bad institutions { cannot be captured unless a country improves
institutions to at least the level slightly better than the trading partner's. When both countries
set their institutional quality simultaneously and non-cooperatively, equilibrium is characterized
by the best attainable institutions, a Bertrand-like outcome.3 Note that the \race to the top"
result is completely due to the changing preferences of the lobby groups regarding the optimal
institutions: their political power does not change as a result of trade opening. Nonetheless,
1An novel aspect of this paper is that while the large majority of papers employing the Grossman-Helpman
framework apply it to scal instruments { be it taris, taxes, or subsidies { we use it to model the determination of
institutions instead.
2See Levchenko (2007) for a detailed analysis of this result.
3Note that we do not attempt to endogenize trade opening. Endogenous trade policy has been the subject of a
large literature, and remains beyond the scope of this paper (see, e.g., Rodrik 1995, Grossman and Helpman 2002).
Nonetheless, we believe that our exercise is still well worth pursuing. First, in many instances changes in trade
openness have indeed been exogenous, driven by technological shocks or changes in colonial regimes. Second, many
other factors besides ensuing institutional change contribute to the formation of trade policy. Thus, it could be that
even when trade openness is endogenous, it is driven by factors unrelated to those we are modeling. The policy
initiatives promoting unconditional trade liberalization in developing countries are an important example. Finally,
in order to analyze trade opening and endogenous institutions simultaneously, it is important to rst understand
how the former aects the latter. This paper studies that question, and thus can be used as a building block for a
more complete analysis. Indeed, our approach can be viewed as complementary to the trade policy literature, which
endogenizes openness but assumes that institutions are exogenous and do not change with trade opening.
2institutions improve.4
Our framework also reveals the circumstances under which this result would fail to obtain.
The mechanism driving institutional improvement in this model is that rents disappear as a result
of trade opening in the country with inferior institutions. If instead the rents do not disappear,
trade no longer creates the incentive to improve institutions. One way this could occur is due
to dierences in technology. If one of the trading partners has a suciently strong comparative
advantage in the institutionally intensive good, changing institutions in either country will not aect
the specialization patterns. Thus, if technologies in the two countries are suciently dierent, the
race to the top will not occur. In fact, in this case trade opening may actually increase rents rather
than decrease them, and institutions will deteriorate as a result of trade opening in the country
that exports the institutionally intensive good.
Having developed the main intuition regarding the impact of trade opening on institutions, the
paper takes it to the data. Our ability to directly test the main prediction of the model { how
changes in trade openness lead to changes in institutions { is severely limited by two mutually
reinforcing aspects of the data: lack of sucient time series information on institutional quality
and the extreme long-run persistence of institutions.5 As a result of these data limitations, it
has proven infeasible to detect a statistically signicant impact of trade opening on changes in
institutions within countries over time. Instead, we provide empirical evidence for a closely re-
lated cross-sectional prediction of the model: countries that have a predisposition to export in
institutionally intensive sectors will tend to exhibit better equilibrium institutional quality. This
is because improving institutions will allow these countries to retain or attract the institutionally
dependent sectors. By contrast, countries with a suciently strong comparative disadvantage in
the institutionally intensive goods have no incentive to improve institutions and thus on average
equilibrium institutional quality will tend to be lower in those countries.
To empirically test this prediction, we must rst establish which countries would be the most
4Thus, in order to observe institutional improvement, trade need not necessarily tip the balance of political power
in favor of the \right" groups, as in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005b). In our framework, the exact same
special interests that perpetuated bad institutions in autarky will favor institutional improvement when the country
opens to trade.
5There are no reliable datasets on institutional quality with suciently long time series to capture enough episodes
of institutional change, and especially relate them to episodes of trade opening. Though the International Country
Risk Guide (the dataset with the longest available time series on the quality of economic institutions such as rule
of law) has observations for several dozen countries going back to 1984, even 20-25 years of data is not enough to
exploit the time dimension for econometric estimation, because it is well known that institutions are formed over
the long run and are very persistent. The best existing treatments of institutions point out that variables such as
settler mortality (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001), and Atlantic trade (Acemoglu et al. 2005b) in the 1500s
and 1600s still aect institutions in 2000. How long islands have been colonized between the 1500s and 1800s, and
by which colonial power, still impacts institutions today as well (Feyrer and Sacerdote 2009). In the world in which
institutions are formed and persist over centuries, data for the last two decades of the twentieth century may not
contain enough meaningful time variation for statistical testing.
3able to attract the institutionally dependent sectors under trade. We develop a measure of predicted
comparative (dis)advantage in institutionally intensive sectors following a strategy similar to Do
and Levchenko (2007) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009). The key idea is to use exogenous
geographic variables to predict each country's export pattern, by expanding the methodology of
Frankel and Romer (1999). These authors use the gravity model to predict bilateral trade volumes
between each pair of countries based on a set of geographical variables, such as bilateral distance,
common border, area, and population. Summing up across trading partners then yields, for each
country, its \natural openness:" the overall trade to GDP as predicted by its geography. In order
to get a measure of predicted trade patterns rather than total trade volumes, Do and Levchenko
(2007) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009)'s point of departure is to estimate the Frankel and
Romer gravity regressions for each industry. This makes it possible to obtain the predicted trade
volume not just in each country, but also in each sector within each country. Combining these with
an index of \institutional intensity" at industry level from Nunn (2007) yields a measure of predicted
institutional intensity of exports. In essence, this approach uses exogenous geographical variables,
together with information on how those geographical variables aect industries dierentially, to
construct a measure of how institutionally intensive a country's export pattern is expected to be.
A country's predicted institutional intensity of exports is indeed a robust determinant of insti-
tutions in a cross-section of 141 countries. Countries that due to their geography have the potential
to export in institutionally intensive sectors have better institutions, all else equal. This result is
robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, use of alternative predicted institutional intensity
of exports measures, and subsamples.
It is important to emphasize the tradeos associated with our cross-sectional approach. Its
main disadvantage is that the ndings may be driven by omitted variables. While we do include a
large set of controls, adding country variables is inevitably a more limited way of ruling out omitted
variables than country xed eects. In addition, since the cross-sectional results do not directly
demonstrate that changes in institutions occur in response to changes in trade openness, they are
only suggestive of the mechanisms proposed in the theory. The advantage is that we can exploit the
cross-sectional variation in institutional quality. This variation contains valuable information and
is much greater than the within-country time variation available in institutional quality data. The
cross-sectional approach also allows us to rely on exogenous geographical characteristics to predict
a country's predisposition to export in institutionally intensive sectors. Since geography does not
change over time, this strategy is only implementable in the cross-section.
This paper is part of a growing literature on the impact of trade openness on domestic institu-
tions. Using dierent theoretical frameworks, Segura-Cayuela (2006), Stefanadis (2010), and Dal
4B o and Dal B o (2011) demonstrate that economic institutions and policies can deteriorate as a
result of trade opening in countries with weak political institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2005b) argue
that in some West European countries, Atlantic trade during the period 1500-1850 engendered
good institutions by creating a merchant class, that became a powerful lobby for institutional im-
provement. Do and Levchenko (2009) develop a model in which trade opening creates incentives
to improve institutions, but may also lead to strengthening of elites.6 This paper is the rst to
model the eect of trade on institutions using a framework in which institutions matter for trade
patterns themselves. Doing so allows us to study this question in a model that features two-way
interactions between institutions and trade, and therefore use the insights from the literature on
institutional comparative advantage. In addition, this framework has the advantage of tractability
while at the same time generating a rich set of comparative statics.
Empirical studies by Ades and Di Tella (1997), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), and
Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) nd that overall trade openness has a positive eect on institutional
quality in a cross-section of countries. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) demonstrate that institutional
quality rises following trade liberalization episodes. This paper focuses on predicted institutional
intensity of trade patterns, and shows that it has much greater explanatory power than the overall
trade openness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the production and trade side of
the model, deriving the autarky and trade equilibria at each exogenously given level of institutional
quality of the trading partners. Section 3 endogenizes institutions in a political economy framework
with lobbying, and presents the main analytical results of the paper. Section 4 describes the
empirical strategy and results. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of Propositions are collected in the
Appendix.
2 A Model of Institutions, Production, and Trade
This section briey lays out the Levchenko (2007) model of production and trade in the presence
of institutional comparative advantage. There are two factors, capital (K) and entrepreneurs (H),
and three goods. The K-good and the H-good require only one factor, with one unit of capital
producing a units of the K-good, and one unit of H producing b units of the H-good. Prot
maximization and constant returns to scale imply that
pKa = r and pHb = w; (1)
where r is the return to capital, w is the return to entrepreneurs, and pK and pH are goods prices.
6Also related is the literature on the impact of trade on natural resource extraction and the tragedy of the commons
(see, among others, Tornell and Lane 1999, Copeland and Taylor 2009).
5The third good, M, is produced with a Leontief technology that combines one unit of H and
x units of K to produce y units of the M-good. Production of M requires relationship-specic
investments, and thus the quality of a country's institutions matters in this sector. When contracts
are incomplete, the presence of relationship-specic investments leads to the well-known holdup
problem, and distorts resource allocations in the economy.7 Following Caballero and Hammour
(1998), we assume that when H and K form a production unit in the M-sector, a fraction  of
K's investment becomes specic to the relationship.8 The parameter  captures the quality of
contract enforcement, with lower values of  corresponding to better institutions. When contracts
are well-enforced, a lower fraction of K's investment is subject to holdup. In other words, contracts
are less incomplete in countries with better institutions. When  = 0, institutions are perfect and
the environment is frictionless.
How does imperfect institutional quality aect the production allocations? Once K forms
a production unit with H, it can only recover a fraction (1   ) of its investment. For capital
to operate in the M-sector, it must be compensated with a share of the surplus, dened as the
revenue minus the ex post opportunity costs of the factors: s = pMy   w   r(1   )x. Assuming
for simplicity that each party receives one half of the surplus through ex post Nash bargaining, K
will only enter the M-sector if its individual rationality constraint is satised: r(1 )x+ 1
2s  rx.
Rearranging leads to a joint restriction on the prices pM, w, and r that must hold for production
to occur in the M-sector:
pMy  w + (1 + )rx: (2)
To complete the description of the setup, it remains to specify the demand side. Utility is
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positive. Letting the numeraire be the ideal price index associated with Cobb{Douglas utility,



























In order to characterize the autarky equilibrium, we must impose market clearing. Let E be the
share of H employed in the M-sector. Then, production of the M-, H-, and K-goods is yEH,
7The important landmarks in the literature on relationship specicity and incomplete contracts include, among
others, Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore
(1990).
8For concreteness, in this model H can be thought of as managers or inside capital, while K would be the outside,
or unorganized capital. This interpretation would be in line with the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(1998)'s emphasis of the role of institutions in the market for external nance. However, it is important to emphasize
that this modeling approach is more general and applies to many kinds of production relationships.












H; CH = b(1   E)H; and CM = yEH: (4)
The autarky equilibrium is a set of prices and the resource allocation fpK;pH;pM;r;w;Eg that
satises equations (1) through (4).9
The key consequence of imperfect institutions in this model is that in equilibrium one of the
factors is segmented: its rewards dier across sectors. Using equation (2), we can show that the




[pMy   w   (1   )rx] = w + rx: (5)
Each unit of H employed in the M-sector receives its ex post opportunity cost w, and in addition
earns rents of size rx.10
It is also well-known that contracting imperfections lead to the equilibrium that is inecient:
the M-sector is too small, and w and r are too low compared to the ecient case. This is because
imperfect institutions make it harder to induce capital to enter the M-sector. Relative to the
frictionless case, w and r must be depressed, and pM increased to satisfy the individual rationality
condition for K, (2). In equilibrium, that means reducing the size of the M-sector, which simulta-
neously increases production in the K- and H-sectors, lowering w and r and raising pM. The eect
is monotonic in : higher values of  imply lower equilibrium E, w, and r.
2.2 Trade Equilibrium and Institutional Comparative Advantage
Suppose that there are two countries, A and B, and that international trade is costless. Let




be the vector of country endowments, so that K = KA + KB and H = HA + HB. In order to
endogenize institutions in the next section, we must rst understand what happens in this model
at any given level of institutional dierences. Suppose that country c's institutions are given by c,
c = A;B. In addition, let there be a Ricardian productivity dierence in the M-sector: yA 6= yB.
The trade equilibrium can be analyzed by rst constructing the integrated equilibrium: the
resource allocation that results under perfect factor mobility. The key intuition is that if one
9Notice that in equilibrium, condition (2) will hold with equality.
10Even though entrepreneurs are strictly better o in the M-sector, we assume that they do not expend real
resources competing to be allocated there. Allowing for rent dissipation does not qualitatively alter any of the results
below as long as it is not complete, and the total resources wasted by competing agents are less than the total size
of the M-sector rents. Complete rent dissipation can be ruled out by some relatively innocuous assumptions. For
example, rents are not completely dissipated when agents are risk averse, or when agents dier in how much they
value being in the M-sector. Hillman (1989, pp. 58-72) provides a detailed discussion of conditions under which
complete rent dissipation does not occur.
7country can produce one of the goods more cheaply than the other at a common set of factor
prices, in the integrated equilibrium only that country's production process will be used to produce
that particular good. Facing the same factor prices w and r, country A can produce the M-good at
a price of pM =
w+(1+A)rx
yA . Country B can deliver the M-good at the price equal to
w+(1+B)rx
yB .
Thus, in the integrated equilibrium, only the country in which this value is lowest will produce
the M-good. Without loss of generality, suppose that country A can produce the M-good more
cheaply:
w + (1 + A)rx
yA
<
w + (1 + B)rx
yB
: (6)
The trade pattern is described by the following Denition and Proposition (see Helpman and
Krugman 1985, Davis 1995, Levchenko 2007).11
Denition 1 Let ic denote the share of the integrated equilibrium production of good i that comes
from country c. Then, the Factor Price Equalization (FPE) set under equation (6) is a set of
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V (i) for c = A;Bg:
where V (i) is the integrated equilibrium use of the factors in industry i = H;K;M.
According to Denition 1, countries' factor endowments belong to the FPE set when i) country
A has enough of both factors to produce the entire integrated equilibrium world quantity of the
M-good; and ii) the integrated equilibrium production of the K- and H-goods can be allocated
between the two countries while keeping all factors fully employed.
Proposition 1 When equation (6) is satised, and
 
V A;V B
2 FPE, the trade equilibrium world
resource allocation, factor prices, and goods prices replicate those of the integrated equilibrium.
Therefore, in the trade equilibrium, only country A produces the M-good.
For the purposes of endogenizing institutions, the most important result is that the M-sector
disappears following trade opening in country B. As a result, the rents H was earning in the
M-sector disappear upon trade opening as well. Returns to H in country B in autarky can be
expressed as:
wBHB + BrBxEBHB;





equation (6) holds for
some values of w;r, but not for others. It will only arise if the country with higher productivity is also the one with
inferior institutions: yA > yB and 
A > 
B, and can always be ruled out by assuming that x is suciently low.
8while under trade they are simply wTHB. Note that this does not have unambiguous implications
for aggregate welfare, or even overall returns to H in country B: though H formerly employed in
the M-sector loses rents, the base return to H, w, may go up as a result of trade. What matters
for the purposes of this paper is that the behavior of rents in autarky and under trade has an
important impact on the lobbying game.
Note also that country A can have a comparative advantage in the M-good for two reasons:
i) better institutions, A < B, as in Levchenko (2007); or ii) Ricardian productivity advantage,
yA > yB, as in Davis (1995). Though the precise source of comparative advantage does not aect
any of the preceding discussion, as we show below it has primary importance for how trade opening
aects institutions in the political economy equilibrium.
3 Political Economy of Institutions
This section asks the central question of this paper: how does opening to trade aect institutional
quality? We combine the model of production and trade developed above with the political economy
of special interest groups framework of Grossman and Helpman (1995, 2001, ch. 7-8). We rst
consider equilibrium institutions in autarky, and then describe how these change when two trading
countries set domestic institutions while taking into account those of the trade partner.
3.1 Institutions in Autarky
Suppose there is one policymaker and one interest group representing H { the factor that earns
rents when institutions are imperfect.12 The policymaker receives a nonnegative contribution of
size  from the interest group, and sets institutional quality  to maximize its political objective
function G(;). We adopt the standard assumption that the policymaker maximizes a weighted
sum of the aggregate welfare in the economy, S(), and the political contribution :
G(;) = S() + (1   );
where  2 [0;1]. In this formulation,  can be thought of as parameterizing corruption, and shows
the extent to which the policymaker is captive to the interest group. At one extreme, when  = 1
12This could be because the ownership of H is more concentrated than the ownership of K, and thus H is the only
factor that is able to solve the collective action problem associated with forming a lobby group. If all agents in the
economy lobbied the policymaker, it is well known that the equilibrium policy maximizes aggregate welfare. In this
model, that corresponds to always setting up perfect institutions. Notice that for this reason, some asymmetry in
lobby participation is typically assumed. In our case, it is actually not important whether H or K can lobby. As
will become clear below, if K were the lobby instead of H, the problem would be symmetric: K would lobby the
policymaker to set up institutions such that some of H becomes relationship-specic. In this sense, the assumption in
the previous section that some fraction  of K's investment becomes specic to the relationship is not the primitive
assumption. The primitive assumption is that H can organize into a lobby, while K cannot.
9the policymaker is the benevolent social planner. At the other, when  = 0 it cares only about its
political contributions, and in eect sets the policy to serve exclusively the special interest.
The interest group inuences the policymaker by making its contribution contingent on the
government's choice of . In particular, the interest group confronts the government with a schedule,
 = (), specifying the contribution the policymaker will receive for each level of  that it might
set. The objective function of the interest group is simply H's total welfare, SH(), net of the
contribution:
V (;) = SH()   :
The timing of the game can be thought of as follows: rst, the interest group makes its con-
tribution schedule known to the policymaker. Then the policymaker sets institutional quality .
Given this , agents make their production and consumption decisions. This last stage is simply
the equilibrium outcome of the model in the preceding section. Thus, under the assumptions put
on preferences, aggregate welfare equals aggregate real income:
S() = r()K + [w() + xr()E()]H:
S() is maximized when institutions are perfect ( = 0), and decreases as institutions deteriorate
(dS
d < 0). This is intuitive, since imperfect institutions introduce a distortion in an otherwise
frictionless setting. As discussed in the previous section, the reward to capital, r(), decreases
unambiguously in , as does w().
Imperfect institutions can arise because the agents extracting rents can lobby the policymaker.
The interest group's objective function is entrepreneurs' real income net of the contribution:
V (;) = [w() + xr()E()]H   :
This function makes it apparent why H will lobby for positive : imperfect institutions allow H to
earn rents equal to xr()E()H. The interest group bribes the policymaker to increase  above
the socially optimal value of zero.13 The contribution must be large enough to compensate the
13Strictly speaking, of course, only entrepreneurs in the M-sector earn rents, thus in some sense it would be more
natural to take only this subset of H to be the interest group. The problem with this approach is that the fraction
of entrepreneurs employed in the M-sector is itself a function of institutions in our model, so the boundaries of
the interest group would change with the policy choice. To avoid this problem, we assume that the interest group
represents the entire population of entrepreneurs, and choose to ignore disagreements between its dierent
subsets. An alternative would be to assume that the interest group represents only \inside entrepreneurs" H
I, which
is the part of H that is employed in the M-sector no matter what the value of . In that case, we must put a
restriction ensuring that H
I < EminH, where Emin is the smallest possible equilibrium size of the M-sector. The
analysis under this alternative modeling assumption is qualitatively the same as the one presented in this section.
Note that the inside entrepreneurs always prefer higher  than an interest group that maximizes the welfare of overall
H. This is because higher  unambiguously hurts the entrepreneurs in the H-sector, which the inside entrepreneurs
would not care about.
10government for the disutility it suers from the resulting decrease in aggregate welfare. We now
provide the basic denitions and state the main result.
Denition 2 The policymaker's best-response set to a contribution function () consists of
all feasible policies  that maximize G(;).
Denition 3 A policy aut and a contribution schedule () constitute an equilibrium in
the lobbying game with a single policymaker and a single interest group if i) aut belongs to
the policymaker's best-response set to (); and ii) there exists no other feasible contribution
function 0() and policy 0 such that 0 is in the policymaker's best response set to 0() and
V (0;0()) > V (aut;()).
Proposition 2 The autarky equilibrium institutional quality aut is given by:
aut = arg max
2[0;1]
f[w() + xr()E()]H + r()Kg: (7)
There exist values of  2 [0;1) for which the autarky equilibrium institutions are imperfect: aut > 0.
This Proposition states that the equilibrium value of institutional quality maximizes a weighted
sum of all agents' welfare levels, with higher weight given to those belonging to the interest group.14
Furthermore, for any set of parameters that characterize the production side of the model, if the
power of the interest group is suciently high, equilibrium institutions will be imperfect. This result
captures the notion that in autarky institutions are a function of the country's characteristics, and
bad institutions may arise as an equilibrium outcome.
3.2 Institutions under Trade
We can now contrast these conclusions with the outcome under trade. Suppose that, just as
in autarky, each country has one interest group representing H, and the policymaker's objective
function is unchanged. The timing of events is similar to the autarky case. First, the countries
play the contribution game simultaneously and noncooperatively. Then, production and trade take
place. Under trade, the interest group in each country must take into account institutional quality
of the trading partner. We now state the denitions for the trade game.
Denition 4 Let  c be an arbitrary institutional quality value of country c's trading partner.
Then a feasible contribution schedule (; c) and an institutional quality c are an equilibrium
14The equilibria described in Proposition 2 as well as in Proposition 3 below are in a strict sense not unique,
because there are multiple contribution schedules () that the interest group can implement in order to achieve
a given outcome. However, as long as equation (7) yields a unique solution for aut (even if it is not interior), the
equlibrium outcome of aut is unique.
11response to  c if i) c is the policymaker's best response to the contribution schedule (; c);
and ii) there does not exist a feasible contribution schedule 0(; c) and a level of institutions c0
such that a) c0 is in the policymaker's best response set to 0(; c) and b) V (c0;0(; c)) >
V (c;0(; c)).
Denition 5 A noncooperative equilibrium consists of political contribution functions (; c)




equilibrium response to B and

(;A);B
is an equilibrium response to A.
The following Proposition describes the trade equilibrium.
Proposition 3 When country factor endowments belong to FPE, the equilibrium institutions in
the two countries under trade, A and B, solve two equations in two unknowns given by
c( c) = arg max
c2[0;1]

w(c; c)Hc + cxr(c; c)Ec(c; c)H + cr(c; c)Kc	
; (8)
c = A;B.
This Proposition states that institutions under trade are obtained by simultaneously solving the
equilibrium response functions of the two countries. What makes the outcomes interesting is that
the incentives to change institutions under trade are determined by which country attracts the





y c and country c is at a comparative disadvantage in producing
the M-good, Ec(c; c) = 0 and the rent term cxr(c; c)Ec(c; c)H disappears. If that is
the case, country c's lobby group in principle has an incentive to lobby for lowering c. In order
to build intuition for the mechanisms that can drive institutional change, the next two corollaries
consider some important special cases, before discussing the kinds of outcomes that can obtain in
the general case.
Corollary 1 [\Race to the Top"] When the technology for producing the M-good does not dier
between countries (yA = yB) and country endowments belong to FPE, the equilibrium is character-
ized by perfect institutions in both countries, A = B = 0, and thus the world as a whole reaches
the rst best allocation.
Figure 1 illustrates this special case. It gives the equilibrium best responses for the two countries
as a function of the trading partner's institutions. Up to a certain level of , the best response is
to set domestic  at a level just below the trading partner's. This allows the country to retain the
M-sector, and earn rents. Beyond a certain level of , it is no longer optimal to raise it further, and
12thus as long as a country's institutions are better than the trading partner's, they do not depend
on its . This diagram is reminiscent of the best response functions associated with the Bertrand
duopoly model. Just as in the Bertrand duopoly, the equilibrium is to set both 's to zero.
Recalling the analysis of the trade equilibrium, it is easy to see why the outcome is perfect
institutional quality. The M-sector can only be located in the institutionally superior country, and
only that country's institutions matter in determining the factor prices. If ever c   c  0 with
at least one strict inequality, all parties in country c strictly prefer to improve domestic institutions
to a level just below  c. Not only do w(c; c) and r(c; c) increase as a result, but country
c also captures the worldwide rents associated with locating the M-sector at home.
The mechanisms that made it possible to observe imperfect equilibrium institutions in autarky
no longer work in the presence of a trade partner. Notice that the only reason H lobbies to
increase  above the socially optimal level of zero is because it can earn rents in the M-sector. But
under trade, H will only capture those rents so long as it is the institutionally superior country.
In the institutionally inferior country, H will actually have an incentive to lobby for institutional
improvement, up to a point at which it has at least slightly better institutions than its trade
partner. In eect, competition to capture the rent-bearing M-sector results in a \race to the top"
in institutional quality between countries.
What is remarkable about this result is that under trade, the rst best institutional quality
outcome occurs irrespective of any country characteristics. Both countries can be entirely corrupt
(c = 0), so that the policymakers are completely captive to the special interest group. In au-
tarky, these countries can have very bad institutions. Nevertheless, trade will force institutional
improvement even in the most corrupt country.15
Corollary 2 [Large Technological Dierences] Let yA and yB be such that:








aut is country A's autarky equilibrium institutions, and let country endowments belong to
FPE. Then, in the trade equilibrium A
trade > A
aut, B is indeterminate, and all of world production
of the M-good takes place in A.
Under condition (9), country A's technological advantage in the M-sector is strong, at least relative
to the possible variation in institutions: even if B managed to improve its institutions all the way
to the rst-best level (B = 0), it would still be unable to attract the M-sector as long as country A
15Note that while Corollary 1 holds for all values of , trade leads to institutional improvement only in cases for
which  is suciently low that institutions are imperfect in autarky to begin with.
13retained its autarky institutions. Figure 2 illustrates this outcome. Here, country B's equilibrium
best response is irrelevant, while country A's equilibrium best response is dened by a value A
trade.
Institutions deteriorate in country A: A
trade > A
aut.
What is the intuition for this result? As long as country A can produce the entire integrated
equilibrium world quantity of good M, it is the only country that will produce it under trade. This
is because its Ricardian comparative advantage in good M is strong enough to overcome its inferior
institutions. The equilibrium best responses for the two countries become:
A(B) = arg max
A2[0;1]

w(A)HA + Axr(A)EA(A)H + Ar(A)KA	
; (10)





For both countries, the equilibrium best response expression no longer depends on B, since A
will produce in the rent-bearing M-sector no matter what country B does with its institutions.
Therefore, the \race to the top" result disappears. Country A no longer has an incentive to improve
institutions, because it will not lose the rents to country B. Furthermore, it is easy to demonstrate
that institutions actually deteriorate in country A after trade opening under these circumstances.
Comparing the expressions that dene the autarky and trade institutions in country A, (7) and
(11), we can see that the only dierence between them is the rents term, which increases from
Axr(A)EA(A)HA in autarky to Axr(A)EA(A)H under trade. Thus, the level of A that
maximizes (11) is greater under trade than in autarky.
How can we reconcile these two seemingly opposite results? The unifying mechanism driving
both of them is that trade opening aects institutions through its impact on the rents in the
M-sector, and consequently on H's incentives to lobby. Trade will induce a country to improve
institutions if doing so allows it to retain, or bring back, the rent-bearing M-sector. In the \race
to the top" example, this mechanism operates most starkly: when there are no technological
dierences, countries \compete" purely on  in order to attract M. Corollary 2 provides an
outcome at the opposite extreme: technological dierences are so great that country B cannot
attract the M-sector no matter how much it improves institutions. In that case, neither country B
nor A have an incentive to lower . Having conveyed the basic intuition using these two examples,
we now describe the equilibrium outcomes in the general case.
Corollary 3 [Small Technological Dierences] Without loss of generality, suppose that yA >










14where ~ A solves equation (8) for  c = 0.
This Corollary states that when country A's technological advantage is moderate, such that country
B can capture the M-sector if it improves institutions to the rst-best level, trade opening leads
to institutional improvement in country B. Country A sets institutions at the highest A such
that it can produce in the M-sector when institutions are perfect in B, unless the joint welfare of
the policymaker and the lobby is maximized for a value of A that is lower. Thus, Corollary 3
demonstrates that the key mechanism highlighted above carries over to the general case: countries
will improve institutions when doing so allows them to attract the rent-bearing sector. This will
be the case when neither of the trade partners has too strong of a technological advantage in the
M-sector.16
3.3 Limits to Institutional Improvement
The model can be modied to capture the notion that some countries cannot improve their insti-
tutions as eciently as others. This could be due to inherent geographical or historical dierences
across countries, for instance. What happens when the best attainable level of institutional quality
{ let us call it c { is dierent between countries? The logic of the model remains unchanged, and
the equilibrium is still given by equations (8), with only one modication: the arg max is over a




for both countries c = A;B. The outcomes then depend on the magnitude
of the dierence between A and B. Suppose, without loss of generality, that A < B: country
A can attain better institutions than country B. For simplicity, suppose that there are no techno-
logical dierences: yA = yB. For B low enough, the outcome is depicted in Figure 3. Intuitively,
if one could think of the symmetric equilibrium in Corollary 1 as a Bertrand outcome, this case
is something akin to limit pricing: country A will improve institutions to a level just better than
B. Having worse institutions than B implies that country A loses the M-sector. For low enough
B, having much better institutions than that does not maximize rents in A. As depicted in the
Figure, trade does result in institutional improvement in country A, but to a lesser extent than in
the baseline case, as A does not need to go all the way to the best attainable level of institutional
quality to retain the M-sector.
It is also clear that if B is high enough, there is no institutional improvement in country A at
all, in fact institutions in A may deteriorate as a result of trade opening. This is the case when
B > A
aut. Under autarky institutions in A, trade opening can never result in the loss of the
M-sector, and thus there is no impetus for institutional improvement. In fact, the \limit pricing"
16Note that Corollary 1 can be thought of as a special case of Corollary 3 when yA = yB, while Corollary 2 is the
special case such that 
A = ~ 
A.
15logic implies that institutions will actually deteriorate, as under trade country A can capture more
rents, an intuition similar to that of Corollary 2.
4 Empirical Evidence
Existing empirical studies on the impact of international trade on institutions estimate the simple
relationship between institutional quality and measures of overall trade openness. The main the-
oretical result of the paper is that opening to trade will have a tendency to improve institutions,
suggesting that the overall trade openness should indeed play a positive role. However, this eect
is also highly conditional on country characteristics, as we just demonstrated with several simple
examples. In particular, countries that for some reason cannot capture the institutionally intensive
sectors simply by improving their institutions have no incentive to do so. The empirical evidence
presented in this section is based on this intuition.
Before describing the empirical strategy and results, the theoretical predictions must be modied
appropriately. First, the theoretical results above are predominantly about how opening to trade
changes institutions. However, as argued in the introduction, time series data on institutions are
only available going back 20-25 years, while at the same time institutions have been repeatedly
shown to persist over centuries. Thus, there is simply not enough time variation in available
institutional quality data to demonstrate statistically that changes in trade openness lead to changes
in institutions within a country over time. On the other hand, the data exhibit a great deal of cross-
sectional variation in institutional quality. Thus, we develop a theoretical prediction about how
institutional quality is related to institutional comparative advantage in the cross-section of trading
countries, and the empirical exercise exploits the cross-sectional variation in the data. Second, the
vast majority of countries are small relative to the world economy, which is also characterized by
the presence of some 15 or 20 countries with both a very high institutional quality and a high
productivity (i.e. the OECD) { the \global institutional and technological frontier."
With these two points in mind, the following Corollary presents the main prediction of the
model in the multi-country case:
Corollary 4 [Multiple Small Countries] Consider a set of small countries c = 1;:::;N, that
trade with the world economy and face exogenous world prices of goods pW
M, pW
H , pW
K . The countries








M and ylow < yhigh. Each country sets institutions in the lobbying game
between a domestic interest group and the policymaker described in Section 3. Then, institutions
are perfect ( = 0) in all countries characterized by yhigh, and countries with ylow are indierent
16between any level of institutions  2 [0;1].
This Corollary can be thought of as describing a large number of small countries, all facing the
global institutional and technological frontier: the rest of the world is characterized by both high
productivity in the M-sector, and good institutions. This is the meaning of the restriction on the
top level of productivity in this set of countries, yhigh =
 
pW




M: the world can produce
the M-good relatively cheaply.17
Corollary 4 formalizes the notion that under trade, countries with sucient comparative ad-
vantage in the institutionally intensive good (yhigh) will exhibit on average better institutions than
countries with a comparative disadvantage in that good (ylow). This is the main cross-sectional pre-
diction of the model. It ties comparative advantage to equilibrium institutions in the cross-section
of countries.18
To test this prediction, this paper builds a measure that captures how likely the country is to
export in institutionally intensive sectors, and analyzes how it aects institutions. We thus estimate
the following equation in the cross-section of countries:
INSTc =  + IIXc + Zc + "c: (11)
The left-hand side variable, INSTc; is a measure of a country's quality of institutions, and Zc
is a vector of controls. The right-hand side variable of interest, IIXc, is a measure of predicted
institutional intensity of exports: how easy it is for the country to export in the institutionally
intensive sectors under trade. Of course, this variable is constructed without regard for the country's
actual institutional quality or actual trade patterns, as explained below. The main hypothesis is
that the eect of IIXc on institutions is positive ( > 0). Thus, the empirical strategy is based
on the view that today's institutions are the result of a long period of evolution and subject to
17Though the restriction on productivity stated in terms of the world goods prices may appear unnatural, it is a
formulation that contains some important special cases, but at the same time is more general. One special case is that
the global institutional and technological frontier is characterized by perfect institutions (
W = 0), and productivity
y
W = yhigh. But the formulation admits other cases, such that the world with imperfect institutions but higher
productivity: 
W > 0 and y
W > yhigh.
18This Corollary helps to sidestep another feature of the two-country model, which is that the country with a
very strong technological comparative advantage in the institutionally intensive sector may actually experience a
deterioration of institutions as a result of trade opening. In the world comprised of more than a hundred countries,
however, it is unlikely that any single country will have such a strong technological advantage in institutionally
intensive sectors that it will be able to export in those sectors even if it had bad institutions. That is, in the
presence of the large bloc of OECD countries with a high institutional quality and high productivity, it is unlikely
that any individual country would be so productive in the institutionally intensive sectors that is would actually
nd it optimal to reduce its quality of institutions after trade opening. We conrmed this intuition by examining
whether the relationship between institutional quality and comparative advantage in institutionally intensive sectors
is nonmonotonic: positive at lower values of comparative advantage in institutionally intensive sectors, then turning
negative for higher ones. There appears to be no evidence of such nonmonotonicity.
17inuence by countries' comparative advantage and trade, and exploits the variation in predicted
comparative advantage as dictated by the countries' exogenous geographical characteristics.
4.1 Predicted Institutional Intensity of Exports
To carry out the analysis, the rst step is to construct the predicted institutional intensity of
exports, IIXc, for each country. The strategy in this paper is based on the approach of Do
and Levchenko (2007) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), that expands the geography-based
methodology of Frankel and Romer (1999, henceforth FR). FR construct predicted trade as a
share of GDP by rst estimating a gravity regression on bilateral trade volumes between countries
using only exogenous geographical explanatory variables, such as bilateral distance, land areas, and
populations. From the estimated gravity equation, FR predict bilateral trade between countries
based solely on geographical variables. Then for each country they sum over trade partners to
obtain the predicted total trade to GDP, or \natural openness."
Do and Levchenko (2007)'s goal is to build a measure of export patterns, not aggregate trade
volumes, that is based on exogenous geographical variables. To do this, they extend the FR
methodology to industry level. Their procedure generates predicted exports to GDP in each in-
dustry i and country c, b Xic. We refer the reader to Do and Levchenko (2007) and di Giovanni and
Levchenko (2009) for the detailed description of implementation and justication for this approach.
Armed with predicted sector-level exports, it is straightforward to construct the predicted institu-
tional intensity of exports. This measure weights predicted exports b Xic by a sector-level index of




b Xic  Institutional Intensityi: (12)
Institutional intensity of each sector is sourced from Nunn (2007). It is dened as the fraction of
each industry's inputs not sold on organized exchanges or reference priced, and is constructed based
on US Input-Output Tables. The idea behind this measure is that inputs sold in spot markets {
those that can be obtained on organized exchanges, for instance { do not require contracts and
thus good institutions. However, inputs that cannot be bought this way require relationship-specic
investments and thus rely on good contracting institutions being in place. The higher the fraction
of such inputs in an industry, the higher is its \institutional intensity."
To summarize, the measure used in the analysis, IIXc, captures the institutional intensity of
exports of each country, as predicted exclusively by its exogenous geographic characteristics. It will
be high in a country whose geographical characteristics imply that it is expected to export especially
in sectors that rely on institutions. By contrast, countries expected to export in industries that do
18not rely on institutions will exhibit lower values of IIX. It is important to stress that IIX does not
use any actual data on exports or institutional quality of countries. It is instead constructed using
only the exogenous geographical features of countries and their trading partners, and the same
sector-level gravity coecients applied to all countries. The empirical analysis below demonstrates
that this geographic predisposition to export in institutionally intensive sectors is strongly positively
correlated with actual institutional quality.
4.2 Data Description
The dependent variable, institutional quality, is proxied by the rule of law index from the Gover-
nance Matters database of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). The index is normalized to
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. It therefore ranges from about -2.5 (worst)
to 2.5 (best). Observations come at biyearly frequency, and we take the average across 1996-2000.
The model in this paper is about institutions that govern economic relationships between private
parties, such as enforcement of contracts. This, the rule of law subcomponent of the Governance
Matters database is the most appropriate index to use.
The main right-hand side variable, IIXc, is constructed using the estimates of predicted exports
as a share of GDP for each industry i in country c, b Xic, sourced from Do and Levchenko (2007).
The construction of b Xic is carried out at the 3-digit ISIC revision 2 level for manufacturing trade,
yielding 28 sectors. The estimates of b Xic are then combined with data on institutional intensity
from Nunn (2007) to produce our measures of IIXc. The list of sectors along with their institutional
intensity is presented in Appendix Table A1. The mean share of intermediate inputs not bought
on organized exchanges is 0.487, with a standard deviation across sectors of 0.206. According to
this measure, the least institutionally intensive sector is Petroleum Reneries, with only 6% of all
inputs not bought on organized exchanges. The most institutionally dependent sector is Transport
Equipment, with 86% of inputs that are dierentiated.
The main controls in estimation include overall trade openness (imports plus exports as a share
of GDP) and PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, both of which come from the Penn World Tables
(Heston, Summers and Aten 2002). We also use information on countries' legal origin as dened
by La Porta et al. (1998), extended to include the socialist legal system. The nal sample is a
cross-section of 141 countries and, unless otherwise indicated, the variables are averaged over 30
years, 1970-1999.
Appendix Table A2 presents the data on institutional quality, predicted institutional intensity
of exports, and overall trade openness for the countries in the sample, along with basic summary
statistics. Figure 4 plots institutional quality against the overall trade openness. There is some
19positive association between institutions and overall trade openness, but it is not strong, with the
simple correlation of 0.16 and the Spearman correlation of 0.18. Figure 5 plots institutions against
the predicted institutional intensity of exports instead. There appears to be a closer positive
relationship between these two variables, with both simple and Spearman correlation coecients of
around 0.48. We now turn to a regression analysis of the relationship between these two variables.
4.3 Results
Table 1 presents the baseline results of estimating equation (11). The rst column regresses in-
stitutional quality on simple trade openness. There is a positive and signicant relationship, but
it is not strong, with an R2 of 0.03. When instead in column 2 we regress institutions on IIXc,
the R2 is 0.23, and the variable of interest is signicant at the 1% level, with a t-statistic of 6.3.
Column 3 includes both the trade openness and IIX. The coecient on IIX is actually increased,
while the coecient on trade opennes is of the \wrong" sign. Columns 4 and 5 attempt to control
for other determinants of institutions. We rst include the legal origin dummies from La Porta et
al. (1998), and then per capita income. The latter is meant to capture a country's overall level of
development. While in both of these specications the coecient on IIXc is somewhat smaller,
it nonetheless remains signicant at the 1% level. Finally, column 6 includes both the legal origin
dummies and per capita income on the right-hand side. The coecient on the variable of interest
is further reduced somewhat, but preserves its signicance at the 1% level. The magnitude of
the eect is sizeable but not implausibly large. The most conservative coecient estimates imply
that a one standard deviation change in IIXc is associated with a change in institutional quality
equivalent to 0.19 of its standard deviation.
Examining the denition of IIX, (12), it is clear that this variable will have high values either
because predicted overall trade b Xic is high across all sectors { \natural openness" {, or because the
country is predicted to export relatively more in the institutionally intensive sectors. As evident
from Figure 5, a lot of the variation in IIX is in fact driven by dierences in overall \natural
openness." Conceptually, the main index of IIX, which combines both of these, is correct: what
should matter is the combination of how strong is the disciplining eect of trade { the operall
openness { and how easily the country can start exporting in the advantageous sectors if it were to
improve institutions. Clearly, in the absence of the former, the latter matters little for the incentive
to improve institutions. Nonetheless, we would still like to demonstrate that the results are not
driven exclusively by overall openness.
We do this in several ways. As a preliminary point, note that the overall openness is already
20controlled for in all specications.19 Thus, any eect of IIX is already obtained while netting out
the impact of aggregate openness. Following Frankel and Romer (1999), we control for land area
and population, since those authors nd that natural openness is highly correlated with country
size. The results are reported in Column 7 of Table 1. Clearly, including area and population
does not aect the coecient of interest, in fact neither of these two variables is signicant. As a






ic  Institutional Intensityi:
Here, b !X
ic is the predicted share of total exports in industry i in country c, constructed from the




. This index is
driven solely by the predicted dierences in sectoral export shares across countries. Column 8 of
Table 1 uses it instead of the baseline measure. The results are robust to purging the eects of
\natural openness:" the coecient is signicant with a p-value of 5.3%, even with income, trade
openness, and legal origins as controls.
To further establish that natural openness is not the predominant driving force behind our
results, Table 2 determines whether they are driven by outliers and entrepot countries. Column 1
removes the outliers, dened as countries in the top 5 and bottom 5 percent of the IIX distribution,
and shows that the results are robust. Some of the countries with the highest values of IIX are
also entrepot countries, for which the values of trade openness are high, but much of it is due to re-
exports.20 Column 2 of Table 2 drops these countries, and shows that the coecient estimates are
actually larger and more signicant than in the full sample. To summarize, the variety of exercises
we perform all support the conclusion that the variation in IIX, and therefore our results, are not
driven exclusively by natural openness.
We also check the robustness of the results in several other ways. Table 2 further establishes that
the results are not driven by particular subsamples. Column 3 drops the OECD countries.21 The
next column drops the sub-Saharan African countries. The results are not sensitive to the exclusion
of this region. The economies sometimes called \Asian tigers" experienced some of the fastest
growth of trade and institutional improvement over the postwar period. Column 5 excludes the
19The results are robust to controlling for natural openness instead of actual openness.
20These economies are Bahrain, China-Hong Kong, Guyana, Malta, and Singapore. The 1970-99 average trade as
a share of GDP in these countries ranges from 156 to 340 percent.
21OECD countries in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. We thus exclude the newer members of the OECD, such as Korea and
Mexico.
21Asian tigers, to check that the results are not driven by these particular countries.22 Column 6 drops
Latin America and the Caribbean, showing that the results are robust. Column 7 drops countries
that have more than 60% of their exports in Mining and Quarrying, a sector that includes crude
petroleum.23 The results are robust to the exclusion of these countries. Finally, the East European
countries of the former Communist bloc, as well as China, have experienced rapid increases in trade
openness over this period. To make sure the results are not driven by those countries, column 8
drops former Communist Eastern and Central European countries, countries that belonged to the
former Soviet Union, and China. The results are robust to dropping these countries.24
Table 3 determines whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of additional explanatory
variables. All of the columns include the most stringent set of controls { trade openness, per capita
income, and legal origin dummies { but do not report their coecients to conserve space. The rst
column controls for the level of human capital by including the average years of secondary schooling
in the population from the Barro and Lee (2000) database. The second column includes distance
to the equator.25 Next, we control for the fraction of the population speaking English as the rst
language, sourced from Hall and Jones (1999).26 The fourth column adds the Polity2 index, which
is meant to capture the strength of democratic institutions within a country. This index is sourced
from the Polity IV database.27 Column 5 includes an indicator of ethnic fractionalization, based on
Easterly and Levine (1997).28 Column 6 controls for inequality, by including the Gini coecient of
the income distribution sourced from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Finally, the
last column controls for the proportions of the population that is Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant,
obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999). It is clear that the results
are robust to the inclusion of all of these additional controls.
22In our sample, we consider Asian tigers to be: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.
23These countries are Algeria, Angola, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syrian Arab Republic.
24The results are equally robust to dropping only China, and dropping only Eastern Europe/former USSR. The
dummy for Socialist legal origin has a coecient in column 8 because Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are classied as
having a Socialist legal origin. Dropping those countries in addition to China and Eastern Europe/USSR leaves the
results virtually unchanged.
25Alternatively, we included a tropics indicator, the average number of days with frost, and the mean temperature.
The results were robust.
26Alternatively, we also controlled for the share of the population speaking a European language, and the indicator
for \neo-Europe." The results were robust.
27We also used Polity IV's constraint on the executive variable, which is meant to capture the checks placed on the
power of the executive branch of government. The results were unchanged.
28We also controlled for the ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization using the variables developed by
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003). The results were unchanged.
225 Conclusion
Recent literature has highlighted the role of the quality of institutions in various aspects of countries'
economic performance, including international trade. Given the emerging consensus regarding their
primary importance, the crucial question is what are the forces that could drive institutional change.
The main goal of this paper is to provide a simple framework for modeling the eect of trade on the
political economy of institutions. The building blocks of the analysis are the model of institutional
comparative advantage of Levchenko (2007), and the lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman
(1994, 1995).
What are the main conclusions from this exercise? The key consequence of bad institutions
is the presence of rents that are captured by some parties inside the country. Lobbying can give
rise to imperfect institutions because the agents capturing those rents have an incentive to lobby
in order to retain them. Under trade, however, those very rents disappear in the institutionally
inferior country. In order to regain those rents, the country must improve its institutions vis- a-
vis its trading partner. In equilibrium, there is a \race to the top:" both countries adopt the
best attainable level of institutional quality. This simple framework captures the key idea that bad
institutions are more costly in an open world. However, it is also exible enough to investigate cases
in which institutional improvement does not occur. In particular, if one of the trading partners
has a suciently strong technological comparative advantage in the institutionally intensive good,
institutions will not improve in either country. This is telling about the kinds of circumstances
under which trade brings institutional deterioration { namely, when trade increases, rather than
decreases rents.
Is it the case empirically that trade improves institutions? Currently we do not have enough
time series variation in institutional quality data to examine how changes in trade openness relate
to changes in institutions over time. However, we found strong evidence for a related cross-sectional
prediction of the model: countries that can expect to capture the institutionally intensive sectors
after trade opening tend to exhibit better institutions. While the cross-sectional results are only
suggestive of the mechanisms proposed by theory, they nonetheless point to an important connection
between international trade and institutional quality.
23Appendix A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof follows the standard treatment, see, among others, Helpman
and Krugman (1985, pp. 13-14), Davis (1995), or Levchenko (2007).
Proof of Proposition 2: Grossman and Helpman (2001, ch. 7) show that the equilibrium
policy is jointly ecient, that is, it maximizes the joint welfare of the policymaker and the interest
group. The policymaker's outside option is not to deal with the interest group at all. Thus, the
interest group must provide the policymaker with a utility level at least as great as what it would




Thus, the interest group solves
max
2[0;1]
f[w() + xr()E()]H   g (A.1)
subject to
S() + (1   )  G:
Because the interest group has no reason to give the policymaker a utility level higher than G, the








Plugging the constraint (A.2) back into the optimization problem (A.1) yields the result that the
interest group in eect chooses  to maximize a weighted sum of the its own welfare gross of the
contribution and the aggregate welfare:
max
2[0;1]
f[w() + xr()E()]H + S()g;
which is the same as equation (7). Note that in general, there are many possible contribution
schedules () that can be designed to achieve this outcome.
It remains to show that for low enough values of , institutions are imperfect in the autarky equi-
librium. We can use the autarky equilibrium conditions (1) through (4) to establish the following








That is, H's welfare is strictly increasing in  when institutions are perfect ( = 0). This is because
while w() does decrease in , raising  allows H to earn rents in equilibrium, and for low enough
24 the second eect dominates. Thus, the derivative of the rst term of the maximand in the
expression dening aut, (7), is positive at  = 0. The derivative of the second term is negative,
but can be made arbitrarily small as  ! 0. Thus, there is a value of  2 [0;1), such that the
derivative of the maximand is positive in  at  = 0. This immediately leads to the conclusion
that for those parameter values, aut > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3: The equilibrium responses [(c; c);c] at each possible value of
 c are constructed in a manner similar to the proof of Proposition 2. In particular, Grossman
and Helpman (1995) show that the equilibrium response policy vector in this game must maximize
the joint welfare of the lobby group and the policy maker. The equilibrium response value of c at
each level of  c is then given by:
c( c) = arg max
c2[0;1]

w(c; c)Hc + cxr(c; c)Ec(c; c)H + cr(c; c)Kc	
; (A.3)
for c = A;B. Once again, there are many contribution schedules (; c) that generate this
outcome.
Proof of Corollary 1: We must show that the equilibrium is characterized by c = 0 for c =
A;B. From the expression for the equilibrium response institutions, it is clear that c( c) <  c
for all  c > 0. This is because when a country's institutions are inferior to its trading partner's,
every term in equation (A.3) will increase as a result of moving c below  c. Thus, it must
necessarily be the case that the equilibrium response to any level of the trade partner's institutions
is to set better institutions than the trade partner. This implies that there is no equilibrium for
which either A or B is strictly positive.
Proof of Corollary 2: Follows directly from Proposition 3 and the discussion in the text.




yB , all parties in country A favor










  A; ~ ~ A(B)

;
where A is an innitesimally small positive number, and ~ ~ A(B) is the value of A that solves





yB , or some lower value of A that maximizes (8) given a particular





rx . The same applies to the equilibrium best










  B; ~ ~ B(A)

;






the equilibrium must satisfy the following two inequalities:














It is immediate that these two inequalities do not have an interior solution in B, and thus in




rx , or some smaller ~ A. 
Proof of Corollary 4: From equations (1) and (2) and the specied value of yhigh, it is clear
that countries characterized by yhigh will be able to produce the M-good if they improve institutions
to the best attainable level ( = 0). Therefore, both the lobby group and the policymaker in that
country will favor setting  = 0, and that will be the equilibrium level of institutions in the country
with yhigh. Since ylow < yhigh, the country with ylow will not be able to produce in the M-sector no
matter what its institutions are. Thus, both the policymaker and the lobby group are indierent
between any level of institutional quality. 
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30Figure 2. Equilibrium Best Responses and Equilibrium Institutions, Country A has a Strong
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Notes: This gure presents the scatter plot of the quality of institutions, proxied by the Rule of Law index
from the Governance Matters database of Kaufmann et al. (2005), against the log of exports plus imports
as a share of GDP from the Penn World Tables.
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Notes: This gure presents the scatter plot of the quality of institutions, proxied by the Rule of Law
index from the Governance Matters database of Kaufmann et al. (2005), against the predicted institutional








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table A1. The Institutional Intensity Measure
ISIC Industry Name Institutional Intensity




322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.745
323 Leather products 0.571
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 0.650
331 Wood products, except furniture 0.516
332 Furniture, except metal 0.568
341 Paper and products 0.348
342 Printing and publishing 0.713
351 Industrial chemicals 0.240
352 Other chemicals 0.490
353 Petroleum reneries 0.058
354 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.395
355 Rubber products 0.407
356 Plastic products 0.408
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 0.329
362 Glass and products 0.557
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.377
371 Iron and steel 0.242
372 Non-ferrous metals 0.160
381 Fabricated metal products 0.435
382 Machinery, except electrical 0.764
383 Machinery, electric 0.740
384 Transport equipment 0.859
385 Professional & scientic equipment 0.785
390 Other manufactured products 0.547
Mean 0.487
Standard Deviation 0.206
Notes: Institutional Intensity is the share of intermediate inputs that cannot be bought on organized ex-
changes and is not reference-priced. Source: Nunn (2007).
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